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THE	  DISCOURSE	  OF	  POLITICAL	  CONSTITUTIONALISM	   	  
IN	  CONTEMPORARY	  CHINA	  	   Albert	  H.Y.	  Chen∗	  	  In	   2013,	   there	  was	   a	  well-­‐publicised	   debate	   in	   China	   on	  whether	   it	   should	   be	   	  permissible	   to	   advocate	   “constitutionalism”	   (xianzheng)	   in	   China	   given	   the	  nature	  and	  ideology	  of	  the	  “socialist”	  state	  (under	  the	  leadership	  of	  the	  Chinese	  Communist	   Party)	   in	   China.	   Some	   “leftist”	   scholars	   accused	   advocates	   of	  constitutionalism	   in	   contemporary	   China	   of	   attempting	   to	   substitute	   a	  Western-­‐style	   liberal	   democracy	   for	   the	   existing	   “socialist”	   political	   system,1	  while	   Chinese	   scholars	   writing	   in	   defence	   of	   constitutionalism	   argued	   that	  constitutionalism	   is	   not	   antithetical	   to	   the	   orthodoxy	   and	   proclaimed	   ideals	   of	  the	  People’s	  Republic	  of	  China.2	   Whereas	  this	  debate	  was	  politically	  significant,	  it	   was	   largely	   a	   matter	   of	   polemics.	   In	   comparison,	   the	   discourse	   of	   “political	  constitutionalism”	  that	  emerged	  in	  China	  a	  few	  years	  earlier	   is	  of	  much	  greater	  scholarly	  value,	  and	   is	  more	   likely	   to	  have	  more	   impact	  on	   the	  development	  of	  Chinese	  constitutional	  thought	  in	  the	  longer	  term.	  This,	  then,	  is	  the	  subject	  of	  this	  article.	   	  In	  the	  liberal	  constitutional	  democracies	  of	  the	  contemporary	  Western	  world,	  the	   discourse	   of	   political	   constitutionalism	   distinguishes	   itself	   from	   legal	   or	  judicial	   	   constitutionalism	   by	   focusing	   on	   the	   political	   foundation	   of	   and	  political	   conditions	   for	   the	   legal	   constitution,	   and	   those	   parts	   of	   the	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constitutional	  system	  other	   than	  the	   judiciary	  and	   judicial	   interpretation	  of	   the	  constitution,	  particularly	  judicial	  review	  of	  the	  constitutionality	  of	  governmental	  and	  legislative	  acts,	  and	  judicial	  interpretation	  and	  enforcement	  of	  constitutional	  rights.3	   From	  the	  perspective	  of	  comparative	  constitutionalism	  and	  comparative	  constitutional	   law,	   the	  discourse	  of	  political	   constitutionalism	   in	   contemporary	  China	   is	   worthy	   of	   study.	   Like	   Western	   political	   constitutionalism,	   Chinese	  political	   constitutionalism	   identifies	   itself	   by	   distinguishing	   itself	   from	   judicial	  constitutionalism.	  But	  unlike	  Western	  scholarship	  on	  political	  constitutionalism	  which	  presupposes	  a	  democratic	  political	  system	  and	  which	  seeks	  to	  develop	  or	  enhance	   further	   the	   constitutional	   institutions	   of	   democracy,	   elections,	  parliamentary	   processes,	   separation	   of	   powers,	   checks	   and	   balances,	   political	  accountability	   and	   public	   deliberations,	   the	   discourse	   of	   political	  constitutionalism	   in	   contemporary	   China	   has	   evolved	   within	   a	   one-­‐party	  authoritarian	   communist	   State	   in	   the	   midst	   of	   rapid	   economic	   development,	  sweeping	   social	   changes	   and	  potential	   political	   reform.	  Understanding	  Chinese	  political	  constitutionalism	  enables	  us	  to	  understand	  China’s	  predicament	  as	  she	  stands	  at	  a	  cross-­‐roads	  of	  her	  modern	  history.	   	   	   	   	  	   This	   article	   discusses	   the	   discourse	   of	   political	   constitutionalism	   in	  contemporary	   China	   by	   introducing	   and	   commenting	   on	   the	   scholarship	   of	  Professor	  Gao	  Quanxi,	  the	  leading	  theorist	  of	  political	  constitutionalism	  in	  China	  today.	  Before	  considering	  Gao’s	  thought,	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  provide	  readers	  with	  some	   basic	   information	   about	   modern	   Chinese	   constitutional	   history	   and	   the	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constitutional	  systems	  that	  are	  in	  force	  in	  mainland	  China	  (the	  People’s	  Republic	  of	   China)	   and	   Taiwan	   (the	   Republic	   of	   China)	   today.	   This	   article	   therefore	  consists	  of	  three	  parts.	  Part	  I	  introduces	  the	  historical	  and	  ideological	  contexts	  of	  the	  constitutions	  that	  are	  presently	  in	  force	  in	  mainland	  China	  and	  Taiwan,	  and	  describes	  briefly	  the	  political	  systems	  established	  by	  these	  constitutions.	  Part	  II	  describes	  the	  main	  features	  of	  Gao	  Quanxi’s	  studies	  on	  political	  constitutionalism.	  Part	  III	  concludes	  this	  article	  by	  reflecting	  and	  commenting	  on	  Gao’s	  scholarship.	   	  	  
I	   The	  contexts	  of	  and	  systems	  established	  by	  the	  constitutions	  currently	  
in	  force	  in	  mainland	  China	  and	  Taiwan	  	   This	  part	  of	  the	  article	  first	  introduces	  the	  historical	  and	  ideological	  contexts	  of	   modern	   Chinese	   constitutionalism,	   and	   then	   examines	   the	   political	   systems	  that	   are	   in	   force	   in	   mainland	   China	   and	   Taiwan	   today.	   Following	   the	  chronological	   order	   of	   the	   original	   enactments,	   we	   shall	   begin	   with	   the	  Constitution	  of	  the	  Republic	  of	  China	  (ROC)	  that	  was	  originally	  enacted	  in	  1946	  and	   that	   is	   still	   largely	   in	   force	   in	   Taiwan	   today.	   Then	   we	   shall	   move	   to	   the	  Constitution	  of	  the	  People’s	  Republic	  of	  China	  (PRC).	   	  
The	  ROC	  Constitution	  	   The	  historical	  origins	  of	  the	  ROC	  Constitution	  can	  only	  be	  understood	  in	  light	  of	  modern	  Chinese	  constitutional	  history,4	   which	  begins	  with	  the	  collapse	  of	  the	  Qing	  Empire	  –	  the	  last	  dynasty	  in	  imperial	  China	  –	  in	  the	  1911	  Revolution.5	   The	  establishment	   of	   the	  new	  Republic	   of	   China	   (ROC)	  was	  proclaimed	   in	  1912.	   In	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the	   first	   one	   and	   a	   half	   decade	   of	   the	   republican	   era,	   China	   was	   beset	   by	  warlordism	   and	   civil	   strife.	   In	   1928,	   Chiang	   Kai-­‐shek,	   leader	   of	   the	   Chinese	  Nationalist	  Party	  (Kuomintang	  or	  KMT)	  founded	  by	  Dr	  Sun	  Yat-­‐sen,	  succeeded	  in	  defeating	  the	  warlords	  and	  established	  a	  national	  government	  of	  the	  ROC	  with	  its	  capital	   in	   Nanking.	   However,	   civil	   war	   still	   raged	   between	   the	   KMT	   and	   the	  Chinese	  Communists	  (of	  the	  Chinese	  Communist	  Party	  or	  CCP	  founded	  in	  1921)	  until	   the	   “Xi’an	   Incident”	   of	   1936,	   after	   which	   Chiang	   stopped	   his	   military	  campaigns	   against	   the	   Communists	   (who	   had	   by	   that	   time	   retreated	   to	   the	  remote	  town	  of	  Yanan	  in	  the	  Shaanxi	  Province)	  and	  entered	  into	  an	  alliance	  with	  them	  in	  order	  to	  face	  the	  threat	  of	  Japanese	  invasion.	   	  	   The	   KMT’s	   approach	   to	   constitutional	   development	   was	   based	   on	   Sun	  Yat-­‐sen’s	  three-­‐stage	  programme	  for	  China’s	  political	  transformation.6	   The	  first	  stage	  was	  military	  government	  (junzheng)	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  ending	  warlordism	  and	   unifying	   the	   country.	   The	   second	   was	   preparation	   for	   constitutional	  democracy	   under	   the	   KMT’s	   political	   tutelage	   (xunzheng).	   The	   third	   and	   final	  stage	   would	   be	   constitutional	   government	   (xianzheng).	   Thus	   Chiang’s	  government	   promulgated	   a	   provisional	   constitution	   in	   1931	   known	   as	   the	  Constitution	   of	   the	   ROC	   in	   the	   Period	   of	   Political	   Tutelage	   (Zhonghua	   minguo	  
xunzheng	  shiqi	  yuefa)	  which	  expressly	  vested	  political	  power	  in	  the	  KMT.7	  	   After	   the	  end	  of	   the	  Second	  World	  War	  and	  before	   civil	  war	  erupted	  again	  between	  the	  KMT	  and	  the	  CCP,	  a	  formal	  Constitution	  of	  the	  ROC	  was	  adopted	  by	  a	  constituent	  assembly	  convened	  by	   the	  KMT	   in	  December	  1946.8	   The	  original	  
	   5	  
purpose	  of	  the	  making	  of	  this	  Constitution	  was	  to	  move	  China	  from	  the	  stage	  of	  political	   tutelage	   by	   the	   KMT	   to	   full	   liberal	   constitutional	   democracy	   with	   a	  constitutional	   government	   based	   on	   the	   separation	   of	   powers,	   elected	   by	   free	  multi-­‐party	  election	  and	  respectful	  of	  civil	  liberties	  and	  human	  rights.	  Article	  1	  of	  this	   Constitution	   declares:	   “The	   Republic	   of	   China,	   founded	   on	   the	   Three	  Principles	   of	   the	   People,	   shall	   be	   a	   democratic	   republic	   of	   the	   people,	   to	   be	  governed	  by	  the	  people	  and	  for	  the	  people.”	  The	  Three	  Principles	  of	  the	  People	  represented	   the	   KMT’s	   ideology;	   they	   had	   been	   developed	   by	   Dr	   Sun	   Yat-­‐sen.	  They	   consist	   of	   the	   Principle	   of	   People’s	   National	   Consciousness	   (minzu),	   the	  Principle	  of	  People’s	  Rights	   (minquan)	   and	   the	  Principle	  of	  People’s	  Livelihood	  (minsheng).9	  	   Although	   the	   1946	   ROC	   Constitution	   contains	   provisions	   on	   separation	   of	  powers,	  checks	  and	  balances,	   free	  elections	  and	  the	  guarantee	  of	  human	  rights,	  the	   force	   of	   these	   provisions	   became	   largely	   suspended	   as	   the	   result	   of	   the	  following	   events.10	   As	   China	   descended	   into	   a	   state	   of	   civil	   war,	   the	   KMT-­‐led	  National	  Assembly	  in	  April	  1948	  introduced	  a	  constitutional	  amendment	  known	  as	  the	  “Temporary	  Provisions	  for	  the	  Period	  of	  National	  Mobilization	  to	  Suppress	  the	   Communist	   Rebellion”	   (the	   “Temporary	   Provisions”)	   which	   expanded	   the	  emergency	  powers	  of	  the	  President.	  Jieyan	  (which	  may	  be	  translated	  as	  a	  state	  of	  siege	  or	  martial	  law)	  was	  declared	  by	  the	  KMT	  government	  in	  December	  1948	  in	  mainland	   China	   and	   in	   May	   1949	   in	   Taiwan	   (which	   was	   recovered	   from	   the	  Japanese	  at	   the	  end	  of	   the	  Second	  World	  War	  after	   the	   island	  had	  experienced	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half	  a	  century	  of	  Japanese	  colonial	  rule).	  After	  its	  defeat	  by	  the	  Communist	  forces	  in	  the	  mainland,	  the	  KMT	  government	  retreated	  to	  Taiwan	  in	  1949.11	   	  	   It	   was	   not	   until	   July	   1987	   that	   the	   jieyan	   (martial	   law)	   decree	  was	   finally	  lifted	   by	   President	   Chiang	   Ching-­‐kuo,	   son	   of	   Chiang	   Kai-­‐shek.	   A	   new	   era	   of	  liberalization	   and	  democratization	  was	   thus	   inaugurated	   in	  Taiwan.12	   In	  1991,	  the	  National	  Assembly	   repealed	   the	  Temporary	  Provisions,	   and	   introduced	   the	  first	  of	  a	  series	  of	  constitutional	  amendments	  known	  as	  the	  Additional	  Articles	  to	  the	  ROC	  Constitution.	  Since	  then,	  a	  total	  of	  six	  sets	  of	  further	  amendments	  have	  been	  introduced,	  in	  1992,	  1994,	  1997,	  1999,	  2000	  and	  2005	  respectively,13	   with	  the	  1999	  amendment	  invalidated	  by	  Taiwan’s	  constitutional	  court,	  the	  Council	  of	  Grand	  Justices.	   	  
The	  PRC	  Constitution	  	   After	   defeating	   the	   KMT	   forces,	   the	   CCP	   established	   the	   new	   People’s	  Republic	  of	  China	  (PRC)	  in	  October	  1949.14	   In	  the	  first	  few	  years	  of	  the	  regime,	  China	   was	   governed	   by	   a	   provisional	   constitution	   known	   as	   the	   “Common	  Programme	  of	  the	  Chinese	  People’s	  Political	  Consultative	  Conference”.	  The	  first	  constitution	   of	   the	   PRC	   was	   adopted	   by	   a	   new	   National	   People’s	   Congress	   in	  1954.15	   This	   constitution	   was	   to	   a	   considerable	   extent	   modeled	   on	   the	   1936	  Constitution	  of	  the	  U.S.S.R.,16	   although	  the	  ROC	  Constitution	  was	  included	  among	  the	   reference	   materials	   compiled	   for	   some	   of	   those	   involved	   in	   the	   drafting	  exercise.17	   The	   second	   constitution	   was	   enacted	   in	   1975	   when	   the	   PRC	   was	  under	  the	  “ultra-­‐leftist”	  rule	  that	  began	  with	  the	  launch	  of	  the	  “Great	  Proletarian	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Cultural	  Revolution”	  in	  1966.	  The	  third	  constitution,	  introduced	  two	  years	  after	  Mao	  Zedong’s	  death	  in	  1976,	  was	  a	  product	  of	  the	  period	  of	  transition	  between	  the	   ultra-­‐leftist	   ideology	   and	   the	   new	   orientation	   of	   “socialist	   modernization”	  and	   “reform	   and	   opening”.	   The	   fourth	   constitution,	   which	   (subject	   to	   several	  amendments)	   is	   the	  one	  still	   in	   force	  today,	  was	  enacted	  in	  1982	  and	  has	  since	  served	   as	   the	   constitutional	   embodiment	   of	   Deng	   Xiaoping’s	   ideology	   of	  “socialism	  with	  Chinese	  characteristics”.	   	  	   The	   1982	   Constitution	   was	   drafted	   using	   the	   1954	   Constitution	   as	   the	  baseline	   and	   seeking	   to	   improve	   upon	   it.	   The	   “Four	   Cardinal	   Principles”	  advocated	  by	  Deng	  Xiaoping	  were	  often	  referred	  to	  as	  forming	  a	  key	  ingredient	  of	   the	   guiding	   ideology	   behind	   the	   1982	   Constitution.18	   Deng	   had	   stated	   that	  adherence	   to	   these	   four	   principles	   was	   essential	   for	   the	   purpose	   of	   pursuing	  China’s	   economic	   modernization.19	   The	   four	   principles	   are	   insisting	   on	   the	  socialist	  path,	  insisting	  on	  the	  people’s	  democratic	  dictatorship,	  insisting	  on	  the	  CCP’s	   leadership,	   and	   insisting	   on	   Marxism-­‐Leninism-­‐Mao	   Zedong	   Thought	  (subsequently	  revised	  to	  include	  Deng	  Xiaoping	  Theory	  and	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  “three	  represents”20 ).	   These	   principles	   may	   be	   discerned	   from	   a	   passage	   in	   the	  Preamble	  to	  the	  1982	  Constitution.21	   	  Article	   1	   of	   the	   PRC	   Constitution	   states	   that	   “The	   PRC	   is	   a	   socialist	   state	  under	   the	  people’s	  democratic	  dictatorship	   led	  by	   the	  working	  class	  and	  based	  on	  the	  alliance	  of	  workers	  and	  peasants.	  The	  socialist	  system	  is	  the	  basic	  system	  of	  the	  PRC.”	  “People’s	  democratic	  dictatorship”	  is	  a	  term	  coined	  by	  Mao	  Zedong	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for	   the	   purpose	   of	   the	   indigenous	   application	   of	   the	   Marxist	   concept	   of	  “proletarian	  dictatorship”	  which	   is	   to	  be	  practiced	  after	   the	  socialist	   revolution	  overthrowing	   capitalism.	   The	   leadership	   of	   the	   working	   class	   mentioned	   in	  article	  1	  of	  the	  Constitution	  is	  an	  implicit	  reference	  to	  the	  leadership	  of	  the	  CCP,	  as	  under	   the	  Leninist	   theory	  of	   the	   communist	  party,	   this	  party	   consists	  of	   the	  vanguard	  of	  the	  proletariat	  (i.e.	  the	  working	  class)	  and	  shall	  exercise	  leadership	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  proletariat	  in	  building	  the	  socialist	  society.	   	  After	  the	  1982	  Constitution	  was	  enacted,	  four	  sets	  of	  amendments	  to	  it	  have	  been	   introduced,	   in	  1988,	  1993,	  1999	  and	  2004	  respectively.	  The	  amendments	  reflect	   the	  deepening	   and	   strengthening	  of	   the	  policy	  of	   “reform	  and	  opening”,	  and	   include,	   for	  example,	   the	   introduction	  of	   the	   following	   terms	  and	  concepts	  into	  the	  Constitution:	  the	  preliminary	  stage	  of	  socialism,	  socialism	  with	  Chinese	  characteristics,	  the	  socialist	  market	  economy,	  protecting	  the	  private	  sector	  of	  the	  economy,	  ruling	  the	  country	  according	  to	  law	  and	  building	  a	  socialist	  Rechtsstaat	  (fazhiguojia	   in	   Chinese,	   or	   a	   State	   based	   on	   the	   Rule	   of	   Law),	   and	   protecting	  human	  rights	  and	  private	  property	  rights.	   	  
The	  political	  systems	  established	  by	  the	  constitutions	   	  	   Constitutional	   documents	   of	   states	   establish	   the	   political	   systems	   of	   the	  states	   concerned.	  At	   the	   same	   time,	   they	   function	  within	  and	   in	   the	   context	  of,	  and	   depend	   on,	   such	   political	   systems	   which	   determine	   to	   what	   extent	   a	  constitution	  is	  meaningful	  and	  significant	  in	  practice	  –	  for	  example,	  whether	  it	  is,	  in	  Loewenstein’s	  words,	  a	  “nominal”,	  “semantic”	  or	  “normative”	  constitution.22	   A	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nominal	   constitution	   does	   not	   even	   correspond	   to	   the	   reality	   of	   the	   political	  system	  at	  all	  and	  is	  no	  more	  than	  words	  on	  paper.	  A	  semantic	  constitution	  does	  tell	   us	   something	   about	   the	   political	   system	   and	  how	   it	   operates,	   but	   plays	   no	  significant	   role	   in	   controlling	   the	   behaviour	   of	   political	   actors.	   A	   normative	  constitution	   determines	   who	   become	   power	   holders,	   and	   truly	   regulates	   the	  exercise	  of	  power	  and	  the	  relationship	  between	  power	  holders;	  their	  normative	  force	   is	   internalized	   by	   political	   actors	   who	   take	   the	   rules	   stipulated	   in	   the	  constitution	  seriously,	  respect	  them	  and	  abide	  by	  them.	  In	  this	  section,	  we	  shall	  describe	   briefly	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   political	   systems	   established	   by	   the	  constitutions	  in	  Taiwan	  and	  mainland	  China.	   	   	  
Taiwan	  	   Since	   the	   island’s	   liberalization	   and	   democratization	   in	   the	   late	   1980s	   and	  1990s,	   Taiwan’s	   political	   system	  has	   come	   close	   to	   systems	   in	  Western	   liberal	  constitutional	  democratic	  states.23	   There	  has	  been	  free	  electoral	  competition	  for	  the	   office	   of	   the	   Presidency	   and	   for	   seats	   in	   Parliamentary	   institutions	   among	  different	  political	  parties	  and	  activists.	  A	  two-­‐party	  system	  has	  emerged,	  with	  the	  KMT	   and	   the	  Democratic	   Progressive	   Party	   (DPP)	   being	   the	   dominant	   parties.	  The	   KMT,	  which	   had	   ruled	   Taiwan	   since	   the	   island’s	   return	   from	   Japan	   to	   the	  ROC	  in	  1945,	  handed	  over	  power	  peacefully	  to	  the	  DPP	  after	  the	  former’s	  defeat	  at	  the	  presidential	  election	  of	  2000.	  In	  2008,	  the	  KMT	  was	  back	  in	  power	  with	  its	  leader	  Ma	  Ying-­‐jeou	  elected	  as	  President	  of	  the	  ROC.	   	  	   The	  ROC	  Constitution	  of	  1946	  has	  established	  a	  constitutional	  court	  known	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as	  the	  Council	  of	  Grand	  Justices	  (CGJ)	  of	  the	  Judicial	  Yuan,	  charged	  with	  the	  task	  of	   issuing	   authoritative	   interpretations	   of	   the	   Constitution.	   After	   the	   ROC	  government’s	   retreat	   to	   Taiwan,	   the	   CGJ	   has	   gradually	   built	   up	   a	   record	   of	  judicial	   interpretations	   and	   thus	   also	   its	   institutional	   capacity	   and	   judicial	  authority. 24 	   Most	   of	   the	   early	   judicial	   interpretations	   dealt	   with	   technical	  jurisdictional	   issues	   of	   separation	   of	   powers	   rather	   than	   citizens’	   rights.	  Although	  the	  CGJ	  had	  the	  power	  of	  constitutional	  review	  of	  laws,	  regulations	  and	  decrees,	   it	  did	  not	  exercise	   this	  power	   in	  practice	  until	  1980.25	   Before	   the	   late	  1980s,	   the	   CGJ,	   because	   of	   its	   unimpressive	   record	   in	   dealing	   with	   several	  politically	   sensitive	   cases,	   was	   not	   perceived	   as	   a	   strong	   and	   independent	  guardian	   of	   constitutional	   norms	   and	   rights,	   but	   was	   regarded	   by	   some	   as	   an	  accomplice	  of	   the	  authoritarian	  regime	  merely	  adding	  constitutional	   legitimacy	  to	  it.26	   	  	   The	  image	  of	  the	  CGJ	  began	  to	  change	  for	  the	  better	  in	  the	  second	  half	  of	  the	  1980s.	  The	  CGJ	  became	  more	  activist	  and	  more	  ready	  and	  willing	  to	  exercise	  its	  power	  of	  constitutional	  review	  of	  legislative	  and	  administrative	  acts.27	   In	  1990,	  the	  CGJ	  had	  the	  opportunity	  to	  prove	   its	   importance	  and	  establish	   its	  authority	  when	   the	   question	   of	   the	   re-­‐election	   of	   the	   parliamentary	   institutions28	   (the	  majority	  of	  whose	  members	  were	  still	  those	  elected	  in	  mainland	  China	  in	  the	  late	  1940s,	  whose	  seats	  had	  not	  been	  subject	  to	  periodic	  elections	  because	  in	  theory	  the	  parliamentary	  institutions	  still	  represented	  the	  whole	  of	  China	  and	  yet	  it	  had	  not	  been	  possible	  to	  hold	  elections	  in	  the	  mainland	  since	  1949)	  came	  before	  it.	  In	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the	   famous	   and	   celebrated	   Interpretation	   No	   261,29	   the	   CGJ	   in	   effect	   ordered	  fresh	  elections	   in	  Taiwan	   for	   the	  whole	  of	   the	  parliamentary	   institutions.	  After	  this	  interpretation,	  the	  CGJ	  has	  issued	  many	  more	  interpretations	  on	  questions	  of	  citizens’	   rights	   and	   separation	   of	   powers	   that	   have	   collectively	   established	   the	  CGJ’s	  reputation	  as	  a	  credible,	  respected	  and	  activist	  constitutional	  court.30	   	  
The	  PRC	  	   Unlike	  the	  case	  of	  Taiwan,	  the	  PRC	  in	  mainland	  China	  is	  still	  a	  one-­‐party	  state.	  Since	  the	  Dengist	  era	  of	  “reform	  and	  opening”	  began	  in	  the	  late	  1970s,	  China	  has	  moved	  a	  long	  way	  from	  a	  totalitarian	  communist	  system	  in	  which	  the	  Party-­‐State	  controlled	  all	  social	  and	  economic	  domains	  and	  all	  aspects	  of	  citizens’	  lives	  to	  an	  authoritarian	  political	   system	   that	   has	   committed	   itself	   to	   certain	   standards	   of	  legality31	   and	   has	   fostered	   the	   development	   of	   a	   vibrant	   “socialist	   market	  economy”	   or	   “socialism	   with	   Chinese	   characteristics”	   (or	   what	   some	   outside	  observers	  have	  called	  “capitalism	  with	  Chinese	  characteristics”32),	  which	  in	  turn	  has	  sustained	  the	  rapid	  growth	  of	  domains	  of	  private	  and	  economic	  life	  outside	  the	  direct	  control	  of	  the	  Party-­‐State.	   	  	   In	   theory,	   the	   “supreme	  organ	  of	   state	  power”33	   in	   the	  PRC	   is	   the	  National	  People’s	  Congress,	  which	  is	  elected	  by	  the	  provincial	  people’s	  congresses,	  which	  in	   turn	   are	   elected	   by	   municipal	   people’s	   congresses.	   The	   municipal	   people’s	  congresses	  are	  elected	  by	  the	  county-­‐level	  people’s	  congresses	  which	  are	  directly	  elected	   by	   the	   people.	   In	   practice,	   candidatures	   of	   the	   higher-­‐level	   people’s	  congresses	  are	  determined	  by	  CCP	  bodies,	  and	  the	  National	  People’s	  Congress	  is	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largely	  a	  rubber-­‐stamp	  body	  under	  the	  leadership	  of	  the	  CCP.34	   	  In	  the	  PRC,	  the	  principal	  means	  by	  which	  the	  Constitution	  is	  implemented	  is	  the	  making	   and	   enforcement	   of	   laws	   in	   accordance	  with	   the	   Constitution.35	   In	  the	  era	  of	  “reform	  and	  opening”,	  the	  court	  system	  has	  developed	  rapidly	  in	  terms	  of	   size,	   caseload	   and	   the	   educational	   qualifications	   and	   professionalisation	   of	  judges,36	   but	   it	   has	   also	   been	   beset	   with	   problems	   of	   corruption,	   political	  interference	  in	  judicial	  decision-­‐making	  and	  failure	  to	  enforce	  court	  judgments	  in	  civil	  cases.37	   The	  constitutional	   function	  of	  the	  Chinese	  courts	   is	   to	  try	  cases	   in	  accordance	   with	   the	   law.38	   They	   have	   no	   role	   to	   play	   in	   interpreting	   the	  Constitution	   and	   reviewing	   the	   constitutionality	   of	   legal	   norms	   and	  administrative	  actions.39	   In	  2001,	  the	  Supreme	  People’s	  Court’s	  interpretation	  in	  the	  much	  publicized	  Qi	  Yuling	  case	   seemed	   to	   suggest	   that	  Chinese	  courts	  may	  apply	  constitutional	  provisions	  directly	  in	  adjudicating	  cases,40	   but	  the	  repeal	  by	  the	  Supreme	  People’s	  Court	  itself	  of	  this	  interpretation	  in	  December	  200841	   has	  signaled	  that	  courts	  are	  no	  longer	  permitted	  to	  rely	  on	  or	  refer	  to	  provisions	  of	  the	  Constitution	  in	  their	  adjudicative	  work.	   	  	  
II	   Gao	  Quanxi’s	  Studies	  of	  Political	  Constitutionalism	   	  	   Gao	   Quanxi	   is	   a	   Chinese	   scholar	   of	   Western	   and	   Chinese	   philosophy,	  particularly	   modern	   Western	   political	   thought.	   In	   recent	   years,	   political	  constitutionalism	   has	   been	   his	   main	   research	   interest,	   and	   he	   has	   become	  well-­‐known	   as	   the	   leading	   advocate	   in	   contemporary	   China	   of	   the	   study	   of	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political	  constitutionalism.	  This	  part	  of	  this	  article	  attempts	  to	  provide	  an	  outline	  of	   Gao’s	   scholarship	   on	   political	   constitutionalism	   and	   to	   identify	   its	   most	  significant	  features.	   	  	   Gao	   traced	   the	   origins	   of	   the	   discourse	   of	   political	   constitutionalism	   in	  contemporary	   China	   to	   an	   article	   published	   in	   2008	   by	   Chen	   Duanhong,	  professor	   of	   public	   law	   and	   legal	   and	   political	   philosophy	   at	   the	   law	   school	   of	  Peking	  University.	  The	  article	  was	  entitled	  “The	  Constitution	  as	  the	  Fundamental	  Law	  and	  Higher	  Law	  of	  the	  State”.42	   	   In	  this	  article,	  Chen	  distances	  himself	  from	  constitutional	   law	   scholars	   who	   advocate	   “judicialisation”	   of	   the	   Chinese	  constitution,	   which	   means	   courts	   should	   start	   to	   assume	   an	   active	   role	   in	  interpreting	   the	   constitution	   and	   developing	   a	   jurisprudence	   of	   constitutional	  rights.	   Instead,	   Chen	   proposes	   that	   “as	   far	   as	   matters	   of	   principles,	   values,	  politics	   and	   ideology	   are	   concerned”,	   China	   should	   go	   the	   path	   of	   “political	  constitutionalism	   with	   Chinese	   characteristics”,	   although	   he	   also	   supports	   the	  upgrading	   of	   the	   capacity	   of	   the	   Chinese	   judiciary	   and	   the	   development	   of	   an	  “ordinary,	  concrete	  Rule	  of	  Law”	  in	  China.43	   	  	   Chen’s	  idea	  of	  political	  constitutionalism	  is	  reflected	  in	  his	  emphasis	  on	  the	  fundamental	   importance	  of	   the	  constituent	  power	  and	  “constitutional	  moment”	  of	   constitution-­‐making.	   He	   also	   draws	   a	   distinction	   between	   “capitalist	  constitutions”	  and	  “socialist	  constitutions”.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  Constitution	  of	  the	  PRC,	  Chen	  argues	  that	  the	  subject	  or	  actor	  that	  exercised	  the	  constituent	  power	  in	   constitution-­‐making	   was	   “the	   Chinese	   people	   under	   the	   leadership	   of	   the	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Chinese	   Communist	   Party”.	   Analysing	   the	   text	   of	   the	   Chinese	   constitution,	  particularly	  its	  preamble,	  Chen	  identifies	  what	  he	  calls	  the	  five	  fundamental	  laws	  of	  the	  Chinese	  constitution	  and	  ranks	  them	  in	  order	  of	  priority:	  (1)	  the	  Chinese	  people	   are	   under	   the	   leadership	   of	   the	   Chinese	   Communist	   Party;	   (2)	   China	  should	  practice	  socialism;	  (3)	  China	  should	  practice	  “democratic	  centralism”;	  (4)	  China	  should	  pursue	  socialist	  modernization;	  (5)	  basic	  rights	  and	  human	  rights	  shall	  be	  protected.	   	   	   	  	   Gao	   recognizes	   the	   significance	   of	   Chen’s	   article	   in	   introducing	   into	   the	  Chinese	  discourse	  of	  constitutionalism	  and	  constitutional	  law	  scholarship	  for	  the	  first	   time	   the	  distinction	  between	   “political	   constitutionalism”	  on	   the	  one	  hand	  and	   legal	   or	   judicial	   constitutionalism	   on	   the	   other	   hand.	   Gao	   declares	   that	   he	  shares	  Chen’s	  problematique	  and	  research	  methodology,	  but	  does	  not	  agree	  with	  many	   of	   Chen’s	   views	   and	   some	   aspects	   of	   his	   approach.44	   In	   particular,	   Gao	  criticizes	   Chen	   for	   presupposing	   that	   “might	   is	   right”	   or	   “what	   exists	  must	   be	  reasonable”,45	   and	   for	   ignoring	   questions	   of	   legitimacy	   and	  normativity.46	   Gao	  describes	   Chen’s	   work	   as	   representing	   the	   “left”	   wing	   of	   political	  constitutionalism	   in	   contemporary	   China,	   and	   identifies	   his	   own	   work	   as	  belonging	   to	   the	   “right”	   wing	   of	   Chinese	   political	   constitutionalism.	   He	   also	  points	  out	  that	  the	  distance	  between	  him	  and	  Chen	  may	  actually	  be	  wider	  than	  that	   between	   him	   and	   advocates	   of	   judicial	   constitutionalism,	   such	   as	   scholars	  who	  engage	  in	  purely	  normative	  legal	  studies	  of	  the	  Chinese	  constitution	  and	  its	  interpretation.47	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   What,	  then,	  is	  Gao’s	  understanding	  of	  political	  constitutionalism?	  In	  his	  view,	  political	   constitutionalism	   or	   its	   study	   is	   primarily	   concerned	   with	  nation-­‐state-­‐making,	   constitution-­‐making,	   constitutional	  moments,	   the	   political	  foundation	   of	   the	   constitution,	   and	   the	   political	   dynamics	   of	   constitutional	  evolution.48	   Drawing	  on	  the	  scholarship	  of	  Carl	  Schmitt	  and	  Bruce	  Ackerman,49	  Gao	   emphasizes	   the	   importance	   of	   the	   study	   of	   constitutional	   moments	   (or	  moments	   of	   state	   formation	   and	   constitution-­‐making),	   and	   the	   distinction	  between	   the	   extraordinary	   time	   of	   constitutional	   politics50	   and	   the	   ordinary	  time	  of	  normal	  politics	   and	   routine	  operation	  of	   the	   constitution51	   (such	  as	   its	  judicial	   interpretation).	   For	   Gao,	   the	   key	   to	   constitutionalism	   lies	   in	   the	  transition	  from	  extraordinary	  politics	  to	  ordinary	  politics,52	   and	  from	  revolution	  to	  constitutionalization.53	   	  	   	   One	  of	  Gao’s	  main	  theses	  in	  his	  scholarship	  on	  political	  constitutionalism	  is	  that	   the	   establishment	   of	   constitutionalism	   following	   a	   revolution	   should	   be	  understood	   as	   a	   counter-­‐revolution	   of	   the	   revolution,	   or	   revolutionary	  counter-­‐revolution,54	   which	   consolidates	   the	   achievements	   of	   the	   revolution	  while	   creating	   a	   stable	   political	   order	   in	   which	   the	   political	   power	   of	   the	  Leviathan	   that	   emerges	   from	   the	   revolution	   is	   constrained	   and	   tamed	   by	  constitutional	   doctrines,	   institutions	   and	   processes.55	   Thus	   Gao	   understands	  political	   constitutionalism	   as	   pursuing	   the	   goal	   of	   limited	   government,	   but	  cautions	   against	   a	   static	   understanding	   of	   constitutionalism	   as	   limited	  government.	  Instead,	  he	  points	  out	  that	  constitutionalism	  must	  be	  understood	  in	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the	   context	   of	   revolutions,	   often	   accompanied	   by	   wars,	   in	   which	   new	  nation-­‐states	   (the	   Leviathan)	   are	   created	   with	   a	   new	   concept	   of	   citizenship	  among	   their	   inhabitants,	   and	   in	   which	   the	   people	   as	   sovereign	   exercise	   the	  constituent	   power	   to	   create	   a	   system	   of	   government.	   For	   Gao,	   the	   secret	   to	  constitutionalism	   lies	   in	   the	   relationship	   between	   the	   Leviathan	  moment56	   (of	  the	   creation	   of	   the	   nation-­‐state)	   and	   the	   Lockean	   moment 57 	   (of	   the	  establishment	   of	   a	   constitutional	   order	   that	   constrains	   or	   tames	   the	   Leviathan	  and	   its	   political	   power).	   This	   is	   the	   concern	   of	   political	   constitutionalism,	   not	  judicial	   constitutionalism,	   which	   in	   Gao’s	   view	   is	   only	   relevant	   after	   the	  transition	  from	  extraordinary	  politics	  to	  ordinary	  politics	  has	  been	  achieved	  by	  political	  constitutionalism.	   	  	   Gao	  contrasts	  the	  cases	  of	  England	  and	  France	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  experience	  or	  practice	   of	   political	   constitutionalism.58	   In	   Gao’s	   view,	   the	   French	   Revolution	  exemplified	   the	   exercise	   of	   the	   people’s	   constituent	   power	   in	   the	   creation	   of	   a	  modern	  state.	  However,	  what	  the	  Revolution	  unleashed	  was	  political	  radicalism	  rather	   than	   constitutionalism.	   According	   to	   Gao’s	   analysis,	   constitutionalism	  could	   only	   be	   brought	   into	   existence	   by	   a	   conservatism	   that	   constrained	   the	  absolute	   constituent	  power	  associated	  with	   the	  Revolution.	   In	   the	  French	  case,	  the	   absence	   of	   such	   conservative	   forces	   led	   to	   continuing	   revolution	   and	  bloodshed,	  a	  continuous	  Leviathan	  moment	  with	  no	  stable	  political	  order	  coming	  into	  existence.	  Thus	  the	  French	  Revolution	  gave	  birth	  to	  the	  modern	  nation-­‐state,	  but	  not	  constitutionalism.	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   In	   Gao’s	   view,	   it	   was	   the	   case	   of	   17th	   century	   England,	   particularly	   the	  Glorious	   Revolution	   of	   1688,	   that	   supplied	   the	   paradigmatic	   case	   of	   political	  constitutionalism	  successfully	  at	  work.	  According	  to	  Gao’s	  analysis,	  the	  Glorious	  Revolution	   was	   a	   revolution	   blended	   with	   conservatism,	   traditionalism	   and	  gradualist	   reformism.59	   Gao	  wrote:	   “To	   understand	   political	   constitutionalism,	  we	  must	  turn	  to	  the	  case	  of	  England,	  particularly	  the	  Glorious	  Revolution.	  There	  was	   in	   the	   Glorious	   Revolution	   a	   synthesis	   of	   the	   radicalism	   of	   modern	  revolutionary	  politics	  and	   the	  conservatism	  of	   constitutionalism.	   I	   consider	   the	  Glorious	   Revolution	   the	   most	   classic	   text	   of	   political	   constitutionalism.	   The	  Glorious	   Revolution	   was	   neither	   Hobbesian	   politics	   nor	   common	   law	  constitutionalism;	   it	   exemplified	   something	   new	   -­‐-­‐-­‐	   authentic	   political	  constitutionalism.”60	   	  	   In	   Gao’s	   view,	   the	   Glorious	   Revolution	   was	   a	   constitutional	   moment	   of	  extraordinary	  politics	   in	  which	  a	  modern	  state	  was	  born.	  But	   traditional	   forces	  that	   constrained	   absolutism	   were	   also	   at	   work.	   The	   struggles	   among	   the	  Royalists,	   the	   Whigs	   and	   the	   radical	   republicans	   resulted	   in	   a	   political	  compromise.61	   The	   Leviathan	   moment	   was	   countered	   by	   the	   constitutional	  settlement	  represented	  by	  the	  Bill	  of	  Rights,	  the	  Act	  of	  Settlement	  and	  the	  Act	  of	  Toleration.62 	   These	   constitutional	   instruments,	   according	   to	   Gao’s	   analysis,	  “embodied	  the	  core	  values	  of	  political	  constitutionalism	  and	  its	  conservatism,	  …	  achieved	  a	  synthesis	  of	  revolution	  and	  anti-­‐revolution,	  and	  realized	  the	  justice	  of	  political	   constitutionalism.”63 	   “It	   was	   this	   kind	   of	   justice	   that	   dissolved	   or	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eliminated	  the	  politics	  of	  friend	  and	  enemy	  described	  by	  Carl	  Schmitt,	  prevented	  a	   repetitious	   cycling	   of	   moments	   of	   [constitutional]	   political	   decision-­‐making,	  and	   created	   a	   unified	   political	   community	   of	   citizens	   that	   did	   not	   distinguish	  between	  enemy	  and	  friend.”64	   	  	   In	   Gao’s	   view,	   Locke	  was	   the	   leading	   theorist	   of	   political	   constitutionalism	  and	   of	   the	   Glorious	   Revolution. 65 	   He	   stresses	   that	   Locke’s	   Treatises	   of	  
Government	   should	   not	   be	   taken	   merely	   as	   a	   theory	   of	   ordinary	   politics,	   but	  should	  be	  understood	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  Leviathan	  moment	  of	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  new	  sovereign	  state.66	   The	  rule	  of	  law,	  limited	  government,	  differentiated	  power	  structure	   and	   natural	   rights	   that	   Locke	   advocated	   were	   for	   the	   purpose	   of	  defending	  and	  preserving	  this	  new	  modern	  state.67	   According	  to	  Gao’s	  analysis,	  Locke’s	   theory	   served	   as	   the	   medium	   for	   the	   transformation	   of	   extraordinary	  politics	   into	   ordinary	   politics. 68 	   Thus	   Gao	   stresses	   that	   although	   the	   key	  elements	  of	  Locke’s	  theory	  appear	  to	  be	  the	  basic	  principles	  for	  the	  operation	  of	  ordinary	  politics,	   the	   theory	   can	  only	  be	   fully	  understood	   in	   the	   context	  of	   the	  Leviathan	  moment	  of	  extraordinary	  politics	  and	  state	  creation.69	   The	  theory	  has	  a	  crucial	  role	  to	  play	  as	  a	  medium	  for	  the	  transition	  from	  extraordinary	  politics	  to	  ordinary	  politics.	   	  	   We	   now	   turn	   to	   examine	   how	   Gao	   applies	   his	   theory	   of	   political	  constitutionalism	  to	   the	  case	  of	  China	   itself.	  The	   first	  point	   to	  note	  here	   is	   that	  Gao	  underscores	  the	  importance	  of	  historical	  consciousness	  in	  the	  Chinese	  study	  of	  political	  constitutionalism.70	   Thus	  one	  must	  have	  a	  broad	  overview	  covering	  
	   19	  
at	  least	  one	  full	  century	  of	  modern	  Chinese	  constitutional	  history.	  It	  is	  necessary	  to	   classify	   different	   periods	   in	   this	   history,	   to	   develop	   a	   sympathetic	  understanding	  of	  all	  such	  periods,	  and	  to	  evaluate	  them	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  political	  constitutionalism.71	   	  	   Gao	   identifies	   three	   periods	   of	  modern	   Chinese	   constitutional	   practices	   in	  terms	  of	  the	  “constitutionalization	  of	  the	  spirit	  of	  the	  age”72:	  (1)	  the	  Republic	  of	  China	  created	   in	  1912	  and	   its	  constitutional	   tradition	  (what	  Gao	  calls	   “the	   first	  modern	   China”);	   (2)	   the	   party-­‐state	   established	   by	   the	   KMT	   in	   1928	   and	   the	  party-­‐state	  established	  by	  the	  CCP	  in	  1949	  (“the	  second	  modern	  China”);	  and	  (3)	  the	  Chinese	  state	  during	  its	  era	  of	  reform	  and	  opening	  that	  began	  in	  1978	  with	  its	   1982	   Constitution	   and	   the	   subsequent	   constitutional	   revisions	   (‘the	   third	  modern	  China”.	  	   Looking	  at	  modern	  Chinese	  constitutional	  history	  from	  another	  perspective,	  Gao	  suggests	   that	   there	  exist	   three	  and	  a	  half	  “constitutional	  China’s”73:	   (1)	   the	  Republic	  of	  China	  founded	  in	  1912;	  (2)	  the	  Republic	  of	  China	  established	  by	  the	  KMT	  and	  controlled	  by	  it	  until	  its	  democratization	  in	  Taiwan;	  (3)	  the	  PRC	  under	  the	   leadership	   of	   the	   CCP;	   and	   (3	   1/2)	   the	   China	   that	   is	   not	   yet	   unified	   today,	  which	   hopefully	   will	   become	   unified	   some	   day	   as	   a	   new	   China	   that	   is	   “free,	  constitutional	  and	  democratic”.74	   	  	   Gao	   believes	   that	   the	   Chinese	   study	   of	   political	   constitutionalism	   should	  attempt	  to	  be	  both	  descriptive	  and	  normative;	  it	  should	  reveal	  the	  reality	  of	  the	  constitutional	   or	   political	   system,	   and	   also	   tackle	   questions	   of	   legitimacy,	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constitutionality	   and	   justice.75	   Gao	   is	  particularly	   interested	   in	  uncovering	  and	  discovering	   the	   constitutional	   thinking	   and	  dynamics	   that	   lay	   behind	   the	   facts,	  events	  and	  texts	  of	  modern	  Chinese	  constitutional	  history.	  His	  book-­‐length	  study	  of	   the	   abdication	   of	   the	   Qing	   emperor	   in	   1912	   in	   the	  midst	   of	   revolution	   best	  exemplifies	   the	  application	  of	  his	   approach	  of	  political	   constitutionalism	   to	   the	  study	  of	   Chinese	   constitutional	   phenomena.	  The	  book	   is	   entitled	  Constitutional	  
Moment:	  On	  the	  Abdication	  Decree	  of	  the	  Qing	  Emperor.76	  	   In	   orthodox	   and	   existing	   scholarship	   by	   constitutional	   law	   scholars	   on	   the	  1911	  Revolution	  and	  the	  birth	  of	   the	   first	  Chinese	  republic,	   the	  usual	   focus	  has	  been	  on	  the	  provisional	  constitution	  enacted	  by	  the	  revolutionary	  government	  in	  March	  1912.	  Little	  attention	  has	  been	  paid	  to	  the	  abdication	  of	  the	  Qing	  emperor	  and	  the	  decree	  of	  abdication	  promulgated	  by	  the	  empress	  dowager	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  Qing	  Empire	  in	  February	  1912.	  Gao	  points	  out,	  however,	  that	  this	  decree	  was	  actually	   highly	   significant	   in	   providing	   the	   constitutional	   foundation	   of	   and	  contributing	  to	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  new	  Republic	  of	  China.	   	   	   	  	   In	   early	   1912,	   the	   success	   of	   the	   Revolution	   was	   by	   no	   means	   assured.	  Although	  many	  provinces	  had	  declared	   independence	  of	   the	  Qing	  emperor	  and	  the	   revolutionaries	   had	   established	   a	   new	   republican	   government	   in	   Nanking,	  the	  Qing	   court	   still	   reigned	   in	  Peking	  and	  Yuan	  Shikai,	   a	   senior	  minister	  of	   the	  Qing	  Empire,	  had	  under	  his	  command	  a	  powerful	  army	  which	  had	  full	  capacity	  to	  wage	  a	  civil	  war	  against	   the	  revolutionaries.	   It	  was	   in	   these	  circumstances	   that	  the	   Qing	   court	   was	   pressurized	   to	   abdicate	   and	   to	   hand	   over	   power	   to	   Yuan,	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whom	  the	  revolutionaries	  in	  a	  trade-­‐off	  were	  willing	  to	  accept	  as	  president	  of	  the	  new	  republic.	   	   	   	  	   The	  abdication	  decree	  not	  only	  declared	  the	  abdication	  of	  the	  Qing	  emperor	  but	  also	  authorized	  Yuan	  Shikai	  to	  negotiate	  with	  the	  revolutionaries	  in	  Nanking	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  forming	  a	  republican	  government	  and	  convening	  parliament.77	  It	  also	  legitimised	  the	  transfer	  of	  the	  loyalty	  of	  the	  existing	  multi-­‐ethnic	  subjects	  of	  the	  Qing	  empire	  and	  of	  its	  entire	  territory	  to	  the	  new	  republic78	   –	  which	  was	  significant	   because	   the	   Revolution	   was	   led	   by	   Han	   Chinese	   and	   propelled	   by	  anti-­‐Manchu	  sentiments.	  Thus	  Gao	  points	  out	  that	  the	  new	  republic	  was	  not	  only	  or	   entirely	   a	   creation	   of	   the	  Revolution;	   it	  was	   at	   least	   partly	   the	   product	   of	   a	  peaceful	  and	  deliberate	  transfer	  of	  power	  by	  the	  Qing	  court	  to	  the	  new	  republic.	  Gao	   therefore	   argues	   that	   the	   Qing	   abdication	   decree	   of	   the	   existing	   Chinese	  regime,	   together	   with	   the	   self-­‐proclaimed	   provisional	   constitution	   of	   the	   new	  republic,	   jointly	  constitute	  the	  dual	  constitutional	  basis	  of	  the	  republic;	  the	  two	  constitutional	   instruments	   supplement	   and	   complement	   one	   another	   and	  collectively	  constitute	   the	  new	  Chinese	  state.79	   Gao	  also	  stresses	   that	   the	  spirit	  of	   peaceful	   political	   change	   embodied	   by	   the	   Qing	   abdication	   decree	   was	   an	  important	  antidote	  to	  the	  radical	  and	  violent	  mood	  of	  the	  Revolution.80	   Thus	  the	  Qing	   abdication	   decree	   represents	   the	   “real	   conservative	   spirit	   of	  constitutionalism”	   and	   epitomises	   “the	   Chinese	   version	   of	   the	   Glorious	  Revolution”.81	  	   Although	   China	   had	   a	   “good	   constitutional	   moment”82	   in	   1912	   with	   this	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auspicious	   synthesis	   of	   revolutionary	   radicalism	   and	   peaceful	   political	   change,	  no	  constitutional	  state	  came	  into	  existence	  in	  China.	  For	  Gao,	  the	  major	  problem	  in	  modern	  Chinese	  constitutional	  history	  that	  has	  remained	  unresolved	  is	  how	  to	  move	   from	   revolution	   to	   the	   normal	   politics	   of	   constitutional	   democracy.83	   In	  Gao’s	   view,	   there	  was	   in	  modern	  Chinese	  history	   an	  overdose	  of	   revolutionary	  radicalism	   and	   an	   underdose	   of	   the	   “conservative	   reformism” 84 	   or	  “revolutionary	   counter-­‐revolution”85 	   that	   is	   essential	   for	   the	   emergence	   of	  constitutionalism.	   For	   example,	   as	   Gao	   points	   out,	   although	   the	   Common	  Programme	   of	   1949	   (which	   served	   as	   the	   provisional	   constitution	   of	   the	   PRC)	  and	  the	  first	  constitution	  of	  the	  PRC	  that	  was	  enacted	  in	  1954	  seemed	  initially	  to	  signal	   a	   transition	   from	  extraordinary	  politics	   to	  ordinary	  politics,86	   they	   soon	  gave	  way	  to	  the	  Maoist	  radicalism	  of	  continuing	  proletarian	  revolution.	   	   	  	   Gao	   believes	   that	   even	   today,	   China	   has	   not	   completed	   its	   move	   from	  extraordinary	  politics	  to	  ordinary	  politics.	  It	  is	  neither	  in	  a	  state	  of	  extraordinary	  politics,	  nor	   in	  a	  state	  of	  ordinary	  politics.87	   It	   is	   in	  a	  process	  of	   transition	  that	  has	  been	  taking	  place	  during	  the	  era	  of	  reform	  and	  opening	  that	  began	  in	  the	  late	  1970s.	   At	   the	   level	   of	   constitutional	   law,	   this	   transition	   is	   represented	   by	   the	  1982	  Constitution	  and	   its	   subsequent	   revisions.88	   Insofar	   this	   transition	   is	   still	  ongoing	  and	  uncompleted,	  China’s	  constitutional	  moment	  has	  not	  yet	  expired,89	  or	   is	  yet	   to	  come.	  Before	  the	  transition	   is	  completed,	   the	  conditions	   for	   judicial	  constitutionalism	   do	   not	   exist	   in	   China, 90 	   and	   the	   study	   of	   political	  constitutionalism	   is	   a	   more	   pressing	   need	   than	   the	   study	   of	   judicial	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constitutionalism.91	   Gao	  points	  out	  that	  what	  is	  more	  relevant	  to	  China	  today	  is	  the	  constitutional	  experience	  of	  the	  West	  in	  its	  early	  modern	  history92	   (the	  time	  when	   it	   engaged	   in	   state-­‐building	   and	   underwent	   its	   transition	   from	  extraordinary	  to	  ordinary	  politics),	   rather	   than	  the	   judicial	  constitutionalism	  of	  Western	  states	  today.	   	  	   Gao	  hypothesises	  a	  three-­‐stage	  process	  of	  constitutional	  development	  for	  the	  PRC,	   which	   includes	   (1)	   a	   “revolutionary	   constitution”	   initially	   (most	   typically	  exemplified	   by	   the	   1975	   Constitution	   that	   was	   a	   product	   of	   the	   Cultural	  Revolution	  era),	  followed	  by	  (2)	  a	  “reformist	  constitution”	  (as	  represented	  by	  the	  1982	   Constitution	   and	   its	   revisions),	   and	   finally	   (3)	   a	   “constitution	   of	  constitutionalism”.93	   This	  seems	  to	  echo	  Sun	  Yat-­‐sen’s	  three-­‐stage	  doctrine	  of	  (1)	  military	  rule,	  followed	  by	  (2)	  political	  tutelage,	  and	  eventually	  (3)	  constitutional	  government.94	   Gao	   suggests	   that	   in	   the	   final	   stage	   of	   this	   transition,95	   the	  party-­‐state	  may	  be	   transformed	   into	   a	   constitutional	  democracy.96	   That	  would	  mark	  the	  completion	  of	  China’s	  constitutional	  moment.	   	  	   In	  one	  of	  his	  most	   recent	  works,	  Gao	  studies	   the	  1982	  Constitution	  and	   its	  four	   revisions	   and	   ponders	   their	   significance	   from	   the	   perspective	   of	   the	  development	  of	  Chinese	  constitutionalism	   in	   the	   longer	   term.	  He	   interprets	   the	  1982	   Constitution	   as	   a	   reformist	   constitution	   (as	   distinguished	   from	   its	  predecessors,	   which	  were	   revolutionary	   constitutions),97	   and	   discovers	   a	   new	  constitutional	   spirit	   and	   design	   that	   is	   emerging	   from	   this	   constitution	   and	   its	  four	  revisions	  taken	  as	  a	  whole.98	   On	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  1982	  Constitution	  and	  its	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four	   revisions,	   he	   expresses	   cautious	   optimism	   about	   China’s	   constitutional	  evolution	  ultimately	  towards	  a	  “constitution	  of	  constitutionalism”.99	  	   Gao	   applies	   his	   approach	   of	   political	   constitutionalism	   to	   the	   study	   of	   the	  1982	  Constitution	  and	  its	  revisions.	  He	  points	  out	  that	  the	  principal	  objective	  of,	  and	  a	  main	  theme	  behind,	  the	  1982	  Constitution	  was	  to	  put	  an	  end	  to	  the	  radical	  ideology	  and	  practices	  of	  the	  Cultural	  Revolution	  era,	  which	  included	  continuing	  proletarian	  revolution	  and	  class	  struggles.100	   While	  affirming	  the	  historical	  logic	  and	   achievements	   of	   Chinese	   revolution	   led	   by	   the	   CCP,	   the	   1982	  Constitution	  actually	  puts	  an	  end	  to	  the	  revolution	  by	  seeking	  to	  establish	  a	  stable	  social	  and	  political	  order	  and	  an	  effective	  legal	  system,	  to	  revive	  the	  state	  institutions	  that	  were	   dysfunctional	   during	   the	   Cultural	   Revolution,	   and	   to	   affirm	   the	   supreme	  authority	   of	   the	   Constitution	   itself.	   	   Thus	  Gao	   finds	   in	   this	   constitution	   a	   dual	  theme	  of	  “revolution”	  and	  “de-­‐revolutionarisation”.101	   It	  marks	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	   PRC’s	   transition	   from	   extraordinary	   politics	   to	   ordinary	   politics. 102 	   It	  represents	  the	  logic	  –	  which	  Gao	  considers	  to	  be	  universal	  to	  modern	  states	  born	  of	   revolutions	   –	   of	   “the	   revolution	   withdrawing	   from	   the	   stage	   and	   the	  constitution	   coming	   on	   stage”103,	   or	   the	   constitution	   as	   a	   fundamental	   law	   to	  constrain	   and	   end	   the	   revolution.	   Gao	   believes	   that	   in	   this	   process	   of	  post-­‐revolutionary	   transition,	   the	   political	   nature	   of	   the	   constitution	   (as	  emphasized	   by	   Carl	   Schmitt)	   should	   gradually	   give	   way	   to	   its	   normative	   and	  legal	  nature.104	  	   Gao	   also	   analyses	   the	   political	   constitution	   embodied	   by	   the	   1982	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Constitution,	  basically	  employing	   the	  conceptual	   framework	  developed	  by	  Tian	  Feilong,	  a	  younger	  Chinese	  scholar	  of	  political	  constitutionalism.105	   According	  to	  Tian,106	   the	  fundamental	  principle	  of	  the	  political	  constitution	  of	  the	  PRC	  is	  the	  sovereignty	   of	   the	   people,	   and	   this	   is	   realized	   in	   the	   “three	   bodies”	   that	   exist	  under	   the	  1982	  Constitution	  –	   (1)	   the	  system	  of	   leadership	  and	  representation	  by	   the	   CCP	   which	   is	   “truth-­‐based”,	   (2)	   the	   people’s	   congress	   system	   which	   is	  “procedure-­‐based”,	   and	   (3)	   the	   system	   of	   democratic	   participation	   otherwise	  than	  through	  the	  people’s	  congresses.	  Gao	  analyses	  each	  of	  these	  three	  systems	  and	  their	  problems.	   	   	  	   First,	   as	   regards	   the	   system	   of	   CCP	   leadership	   and	   representation,	   Gao	  believes	  that	  the	  foremost	  problem	  of	  Chinese	  constitutional	  law	  is	  how	  to	  tackle	  the	   relationship	   between	   the	   Party	   and	   the	   State,107 	   and	   the	   relationship	  between	  CCP	  leadership,	  the	  supremacy	  of	  the	  constitution	  and	  the	  sovereignty	  of	   the	   people.	   He	   notes	   that	   the	   1982	   Constitution	   is	   already	   significant	   in	  marking	  the	  transition	  from	  personal	  dictatorship	  by	  the	  Party	  leader	  to	  a	  more	  democratic	  style	  of	  Party	   leadership,	  and	  in	  requiring	  the	  Party	  to	  abide	  by	  the	  constitution	  and	  the	  law	  –	  thus	  introducing	  an	  important	  normative	  element	  into	  China’s	   political	   constitution.108	   He	   also	   considers	   the	   theory	   of	   the	   Party’s	  “three	  representations”	  significant	  as	  a	  further	  development	  of	  the	  theory	  of	  CCP	  leadership	   and	   representation.	   However,	   the	   ultimate	   problem	   of	   how	   to	  reconcile	  Party	  leadership	  with	  the	  popular	  sovereignty,	  democracy	  and	  rule	  of	  law	  that	  are	  affirmed	  by	  the	  Constitution	  is	  yet	  to	  be	  resolved.109	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   Secondly,	  as	   regards	   the	  people’s	  congress	  system,	  Gao	  points	  out	   that	   this	  system	   of	   representation	   is	   indeed	   the	   most	   direct	   manifestation	   of	   the	  sovereignty	  of	  the	  people.	  However,	  he	  acknowledges	  that	  unless	  and	  until	  Party	  leadership	   is	  brought	  under	   the	   full	   control	  of	   the	  Constitution	  and	   is	  no	  more	  than	  symbolic,	  the	  functions	  of	  the	  people’s	  congress	  system	  and	  the	  principle	  of	  judicial	  independence	  are	  unlikely	  to	  be	  fully	  realized.110	   Thirdly,	  as	  regards	  the	  system	  of	  democratic	  participation	  other	   than	  through	  the	  people’s	  congresses,	  Gao	   highlights	   the	   importance	   of	   the	   Chinese	   People’s	   Political	   Consultative	  Conference,	  which	  actually	  had	  a	  long	  history	  dating	  back	  to	  the	  days	  of	  KMT	  rule,	  although	   the	  system	  was	   transformed	  under	  CCP	  rule.	  How	   this	   system	  should	  develop	  in	  future,	  and	  how	  it	  relates	  to	  the	  principle	  of	  popular	  sovereignty,	  are	  major	  issues	  for	  the	  study	  of	  Chinese	  political	  constitutionalism.111	   	   	   	   	   	  	   Turning	  to	   the	   four	  revisions	  to	   the	  1982	  Constitution,	  Gao	  considers	   them	  highly	  significant,	  and	  finds	  in	  them	  a	  new	  constitutional	  spirit	  and	  design	  that	  is	  emerging.112	   Gao	   identifies	   three	  main	   features	  of	   the	  post-­‐1982	  constitutional	  revisions.	   First,	   they	   re-­‐position	   the	   PRC	   and	   re-­‐define	   the	   main	   tasks	   and	  challenges	  for	  the	  state.	  Secondly,	  they	  secure	  the	  release	  of	  civil	  society	  from	  the	  state,	  and	  usher	  in	  a	  new	  separation	  of	  state	  and	  society.	  Thirdly,	  they	  introduce	  into	  the	  constitution	  the	  liberal	  notions	  of	  the	  rule	  of	   law	  (the	  Rechtsstaat),	  the	  protection	   of	   human	   rights	   and	   of	   private	   property.113	   As	   a	   result	   of	   these	  revisions,	   the	   Constitution	   of	   the	   PRC	   that	   is	   currently	   in	   force	   has	   a	   “triple	  structure”	  that	  consists	  of	  the	  principles	  of	  (1)	  mass	  democracy,	  (2)	  proletarian	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dictatorship	  (under	  CCP	  leadership),	  and	  (3)	  rule	  of	  law	  and	  protection	  of	  human	  rights	   and	   private	   property,	   which	   are	   actually	   notions	   of	   liberal	  constitutionalism.	   Gao	   notes	   that	   there	   do	   exist	   tensions	   between	   these	  principles,	  and	  yet	  the	  co-­‐existence	  of	  these	  principles	  is	  a	  primary	  characteristic	  of	   the	   contemporary	   Chinese	   constitution.114 	   Gao	   also	   points	   out	   that	   the	  emerging	   constitutional	   design	   that	   is	   liberal	   is	   in	   fact	   parasitic	   upon	   the	  framework	   of	   the	   existing	   socialist	   constitution115 	   –	   a	   constitution	   that	   is	  undergoing	   gradualist	   reform	   and	   that	   embodies	   a	   kind	   of	   transitional	  constitutionalism.116	   	   	  	   Finally,	   Gao	   suggests	   that	   the	   movement	   of	   China’s	   constitution	   since	   the	  adoption	   of	   the	   1982	   Constitution	   demonstrates	   that	   the	   basic	   principles	   and	  values	   of	  modern	   constitutionalism	   have	   been	   gradually	   incorporated	   into	   the	  Chinese	   constitution.117	   From	   this	   perspective,	   the	   1982	   Constitution	   (with	   its	  revisions)	   is	   not	   merely	   a	   rejection	   of	   the	   leftist	   extremism	   of	   the	   Cultural	  Revolution	  era	  and	  a	  return	  to	  the	  original	  socialist	  constitution	  of	  1954.	   It	  can	  rather	  be	  interpreted	  as	  a	  breakthrough	  from	  socialist	  constitutional	  dogma	  and	  a	   return	   to	   the	  mainstream	  values	  of	   the	   century-­‐old	  quest	  of	  modern	  Chinese	  constitutionalism118	   that	   began	  with	   the	   1911	   Revolution,	   the	   Qing	   abdication	  and	   the	  establishment	  of	   the	  Republic	  of	  China	   in	  1912.	  As	  Gao	  sees	   it,	  China’s	  century-­‐old	   search	   for	   constitutionalism	   shares	   the	   same	   basic	   constitutional	  values119	   and	  goals	  as	  those	  of	  other	  states	  and	  peoples	  in	  the	  modern	  world.120	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III	   Reflections	  and	  Comments	  	  	   China	   is	   the	  most	  populous	  nation	  on	   earth,	   and	  one	  of	   the	   few	   remaining	  states	  ruled	  by	  an	  all-­‐powerful	  communist	  party.	  The	  constitutional	  path	  that	  it	  has	  taken	  so	  far	  or	  is	  likely	  to	  take	  in	  future	  is	  thus	  a	  subject	  of	  great	  theoretical	  and	   practical	   interests	   in	   the	   study	   of	  modern	   constitutionalism.	   Gao	   Quanxi’s	  scholarship	   on	   Chinese	   political	   constitutionalism	   provides	   a	   powerful	  conceptual	   framework	   for	   understanding	   and	   further	   researching	   China’s	  constitutional	  path	  and	  options.	   	  	   In	   contemporary	   Western	   states,	   the	   huge	   scholarly	   interest	   in	   legal	   or	  judicial	   constitutionalism	   as	   distinguished	   from	   political	   constitutionalism	   is	  understandable,	  given	  the	  established	  power	  of	  the	  judiciary	  in	  deciding	  crucial	  issues	   of	   constitutional	   law	   and	   constitutional	   rights.	   Although	   the	   Chinese	  courts,	   unlike	   their	   counterparts	   in	   the	   West,	   have	   little	   role	   to	   play	   in	  constitutional	   interpretation	   and	   no	   role	   to	   play	   in	   the	   review	   of	   the	  constitutionality	  of	  legislative	  and	  executive	  acts	  of	  the	  government,	  the	  recently	  evolving	   Chinese	   scholarship	   of	   constitutional	   law,	   perhaps	   influenced	   by	  scholarly	   trends	   in	   the	   West,	   has	   also	   shown	   a	   keen	   interest	   in	   the	   study	   of	  constitutional	   interpretation	   and	   constitutional	   rights.	   One	   of	   Gao’s	   main	  contributions	  is	  to	  caution	  that	  this	  kind	  of	  constitutional	  jurisprudence	  actually	  fails	  to	  address	  the	  most	  critical	  issues	  and	  the	  most	  pressing	  problems	  that	  the	  Chinese	   constitutional,	   political	   and	   legal	   systems	   face	   today.	  These	   issues	   and	  problems	   can	   only	   be	   revealed,	   understood,	   and,	   hopefully,	   resolved	   by	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scholarship	   oriented	   towards	   political	   –	   rather	   than	   judicial	   or	   legal	   -­‐-­‐-­‐	  constitutionalism.	   	   	   	  	   Gao	  is	  certainly	  right	  in	  pointing	  out	  that	  the	  most	  fundamental	  problems	  of	  the	   Chinese	   constitution	   today	   lie	   in	   the	   domain	   of	   political	   constitutionalism,	  and	  that	  unless	  and	  until	   these	  problems	  are	  addressed,	  talk	  of	   legal	  or	   judicial	  constitutionalism	  would	  only	  be	  empty	  talk	  of	  pure	  academic	  interest	  and	  devoid	  of	   practical	   significance.	   Gao	   criticizes	   scholars	   of	   doctrinal	   or	   technical	  constitutional	   interpretation	   for	   ignoring	   the	   reality	   and	   real	   problems	   of	   the	  Chinese	  constitutional	   system.	  However,	   to	  be	   fair	   to	   these	  Chinese	   scholars	  of	  constitutional	   law,	   it	   would	   probably	   not	   be	   possible	   in	   the	   present	  circumstances	   in	   mainland	   China	   to	   confront	   such	   problems	   directly	   without	  venturing	   into	   the	   “forbidden	   zones”	   of	   “politically	   sensitive”	   issues.	   Under	  Chinese	   law, 121 	   it	   would	   actually	   be	   a	   crime	   to	   attack,	   or	   advocate	   the	  abandonment	  of,	  the	  principle	  of	  Party	  leadership,	  to	  demand	  the	  termination	  of	  the	   CCP’s	   monopoly	   of	   power,	   or	   to	   call	   for	   an	   immediate	   transition	   to	  multi-­‐party	  democracy.	  In	  such	  a	  political	  environment,	  the	  room	  for	  the	  study	  of	  some	  fundamental	  issues	  of	  political	  constitutionalism	  is	  rather	  limited.	   	   	   	   	  	   It	  is	  perhaps	  in	  view	  of	  such	  constraints	  that	  Gao	  himself	  has	  not,	  in	  his	  study	  of	   Chinese	   political	   constitutionalism,	   engaged	   in	   any	   in-­‐depth	   investigation	   of	  the	  realities	  of	  the	  Party’s	  monopoly	  of	  power	  and	  of	  whether	  it	  can	  be	  justified	  or	   should	   be	   critiqued.	   Nor	   has	   he	   worked	   out	   any	   concrete	   proposals	   for	  constitutional	  reform.	  His	  scholarship	  of	  political	  constitutionalism	   is	  mainly	  at	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the	  levels	  of	  theory,	  philosophy	  and	  macro-­‐history.	  We	  now	  proceed	  to	  examine	  his	  contributions	  in	  these	  domains.	   	   	  	   Perhaps	  influenced	  by	  the	  Chinese	  experience	  of	  revolutions	  which	  were	  the	  most	   fundamental	   forces	   shaping	   Chinese	   constitutional	   history	   in	   the	   20th	  century,	  Gao’s	  philosophy	  of	  constitutionalism	  emphasizes	  the	  close	  connection	  and	  tension	  between,	  and	  the	  interaction	  of,	  revolution	  and	  constitutionalization	  (in	  the	  sense	  of	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  constitutional	  state	  in	  which	  state	  power	  is	   subject	   to	   constitutional	   restraint).	   A	  modern	   state	   (like	   China)	   is	   born	   in	   a	  revolution,	  but	  revolution	  is	  not	  necessarily	  followed	  by	  constitutionalization,	  as	  the	  case	  of	  China	  demonstrates.	  One	  of	  Gao’s	  core	  ideas	  is	  that	  there	  is	  actually	  a	  tension	   or	   contradiction	   between	   revolution	   and	   constitutionalization.	   A	  revolution	   is	   a	   radical	   and,	   often,	   violent	   breakup	   of	   an	   existing	   social	   and	  political	  order	  by	  a	  revolutionary	  force	  or	  power;	  constitionalization	  involves	  the	  establishment	   of	   a	   stable	   social	   and	   political	   order	   and	   constraints	   on	   the	  revolutionary	   force	   or	   power.	   A	   revolution	   involves	   the	   distinction	   between	  enemy	   and	   friend;	   constitutionalization	   effaces	   the	   distinction	   between	   enemy	  and	  friend.122	   	   	  	   Given	  such	  contradiction	  between	  revolution	  and	  constitutionalization,	  Gao	  points	   out	   that	   constitutionalization	   can	   only	   be	   achieved	   by	   a	  counter-­‐revolution	   of	   the	   revolution,	   and	   a	   conservative	   force	   that	   is	   peaceful	  and	  reformist	  rather	   than	  violent	  and	  revolutionary.	  Whether	   this	  conservative	  force	   exists	   and	   comes	   into	   play	   during	   or	   immediately	   after	   a	   revolution	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determines	  whether	  constitutionalization	  can	  be	  achieved.	  Thus	  Gao	  sees	  in	  the	  Glorious	   Revolution	   of	   17th	   century	   England	   the	   paradigmatic	   case	   of	  constitutionalization,	   and	   in	   Locke’s	   political	   philosophy	   the	   classic	   text	   of	  constitutionalization.	   In	   the	   case	   of	   modern	   China,	   the	   failure	   of	  constitutionalization	   was	   apparently	   due	   to	   the	   overwhelming	   power	   of	   the	  radical	   forces	   of	   revolution	   and	   the	   relative	   absence	   or	   weakness	   of	   the	  conservative	   force	   of	   constitutionalization.	   Thus	   Gao	   seeks	   to	   retrieve	   and	  extract	   from	   modern	   Chinese	   constitutional	   history	   the	   precious	   conservative	  force	  of	  peaceful	  reform,	  which	  he	   finds	   in	   the	  Qing	  abdication	  decree	  of	  1912.	  He	   also	   finds	   an	   encouraging	   force	   of	   gradualist	   reform	   behind	   the	   1982	  Constitution	  and	  its	  revisions.	   	  	   It	   might	   be	   instructive	   here	   to	   reflect	   on	   Gao’s	   understanding	   of	   the	  emergence	  of	  constitutionalism	  in	  modern	  Western	  history	  and	  his	  observations	  about	   the	   relationship	   between	   the	   Chinese	   revolution	   and	   the	   difficulties	   of	  establishing	   constitutionalism	   in	   modern	   China.	   Insofar	   as	   Gao	   privileges	   the	  Glorious	   Revolution	   as	   the	   paradigmatic	   case	   of	   constitutionalization	   in	   the	  modern	   West,	   he	   seems	   to	   have	   under-­‐emphasized	   the	   contribution	   of	   the	  American	  and	  French	  revolutions	  of	  the	  late	  18th	  century,	  and	  the	  constitutions	  and	   constitutional	   thinking	   they	   produced,	   to	   the	   development	   of	   Western	  constitutional	  thought	  and	  practice.	  The	  relationship	  between	  these	  revolutions	  and	   constitutionalization	   may	   throw	   doubt	   on	   Gao’s	   thesis	   that	   a	  “counter-­‐revolution	  of	   the	  revolution”	  and	  a	  dose	  of	  conservatism	  are	  essential	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for	  the	  purpose	  of	  successful	  constitutional	  practice.	   	  	   Gao’s	   explanation	   of	   the	   lack	   or	   slowness	   of	   development	   of	  constitutionalism	   in	  China	   in	   terms	  of	   an	   overdose	   of	   revolutionary	   radicalism	  and	   an	   underdose	   of	   conservatism	   in	   modern	   Chinese	   history	   may	   also	   be	  questioned,	  particularly	  since	  the	  has	  not	  sufficiently	  defined	  what	  he	  means	  by	  “revolution”,	  a	  term	  and	  concept	  which	  he	  frequently	  uses	  and	  relies	  on	  heavily	  as	   an	   ingredient	   of	   his	   theory.	   If	   revolution	   refers	   to	   the	   overthrow	   of	   the	  Republic	  of	  China	  regime	  and	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  People’s	  Republic	  of	  China,	  then	   it	   occurred	   in	   1949.	   Gao	   has	   not	   sufficiently	   explored	   how	   the	   “radical”	  forces	   behind	   a	   revolution	   that	   took	   place	   65	   years	   ago	   can	   account	   for	   the	  constitutional	   situation	   of	   China	   today,	   or	   what	   exactly	   was	   the	   nature	   and	  content	   of	   such	   radical	   forces.	  One	  possible	   solution	  would	  be	   to	   identify	   such	  forces	  as	  including	  the	  rejection	  of	  the	  Rule	  of	  Law,	  separation	  of	  powers,	  checks	  and	   balance,	   human	   rights	   and	   “constitutionalism”	   itself	   as	   “bourgeois”	   and	  inconsistent	   with	   or	   irrelevant	   to	   the	   “socialist”	   state	   which	   the	   Chinese	  Communist	   Party	   intended	   to	   construct.	   If	   this	   is	   the	   case,	   then	   the	   future	   of	  constitutionalism	  in	  China	  would	  seem	  to	  depend	  on	  the	  decline	  and	  repudiation	  of	  such	  anti-­‐constitutional	  forces	  and	  ideas	  in	  China.	   	  	   In	  this	  author’s	  opinion,	  Gao’s	  most	  important	  thesis	  and	  insight	  is	  that	  China	  today	   is	  neither	   in	  a	   state	  of	   extraordinary	  or	   constitutional	  politics,	  nor	  has	   it	  reached	   a	   state	   of	   ordinary	   politics	   in	  which	   political	   constitutionalism	   can	   or	  should	   give	   way	   to	   judicial	   constitutionalism.	   	   Instead,	   China	   is	   in	   a	   state	   of	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transition,	  and	  the	  challenges	  of	  transition	  include	  the	  resolution	  of	  fundamental	  issues	  of	  political	   constitutionalism	  such	  as	   the	   relationship	  between	   the	  Party	  and	  the	  State	  (including	  the	  people’s	  congresses),	  and	  the	  relationship	  between	  popular	   sovereignty	   and	   Party	   leadership.	   Although	   Gao	   has	   not	   explicitly	  advocated	   a	   move	   towards	   the	   kind	   of	   Western-­‐style	   liberal-­‐democratic	  constitutional	  systems	  that	  have	  been	  introduced	  in	  Taiwan	  and	  South	  Korea	  (as	  parts	   of	   the	  Chinese	  Confucian	   cultural	   sphere),	   his	   liberal	   inclinations	  may	  be	  seen	   in	   his	   three-­‐stage	   evolutionary	   model	   of	   “revolutionary	   constitution”,	  “reformist	   constitution”	   and	   “constitution	   of	   constitutionalism”,	   and	   his	   thesis	  that	  the	  1982	  Constitution	  and	  its	  liberalizing	  revisions	  may	  herald	  a	  return,	  not	  to	   the	   first	   socialist	   Chinese	   constitution	  of	   1954,	   but	   to	   the	   grand	   tradition	  of	  modern	  Chinese	  constitutionalism	  that	  is	  a	  century	  old.123	   Although	  Gao	  has	  not	  made	  explicit	  what	  exactly	  this	  grand	  tradition	  is,	  it	  is	  reasonably	  arguable	  that	  it	  is	  that	  inspired	  by	  the	  constitutional	  thought	  of	  the	  1911	  Revolution	  and	  of	  the	  Republic	  of	  China	   founded	   in	  1912,	   and	  which	  contains	   the	   seeds	  of	   liberalism	  and	  democracy	  planted	  by	   the	  1946	  Constitution	  of	   the	  Republic	   of	  China	   that	  have	  born	  fruits	  in	  Taiwan	  today.	   	  	   In	   the	   final	   analysis,	   it	  must	   be	   recognised	   that	   there	   exist	   very	   divergent	  assessments	   of	   the	   possibility	   and	   limits	   of	   constitutionalism	   within	   a	  Marxist-­‐Leninist	  state	  like	  the	  PRC	  that	  insists	  on	  the	  monopoly	  of	  power	  by	  the	  ruling	   communist	  party.	  One	  view,	   for	   example,	   is	   that	   “socialist	   constitutions”	  (like	  the	  PRC	  constitution)	  do	  not	  deserve	  to	  be	  recognised	  as	  giving	  rise	  to	  any	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form	   of	   constitutionalism,	   because	   their	   legitimating	   principle	   is	   a	  “supra-­‐individual	   absolute	   truth”	   rather	   than	   based	   on	   values	   of	   individual	  autonomy	   and	   pluralism,124 	   and	   the	   supreme	   position	   they	   accord	   to	   the	  communist	  party	  “is	  legitimized	  by	  superior	  insight	  in	  the	  ultimate	  aim	  of	  history	  and	  the	  true	  interest	  of	  the	  people”.125	   However,	  more	  sympathetic	  accounts	  of	  the	   relationship	   between	   constitutionalism	   and	   the	   PRC	   political	   and	   legal	  system	   also	   exist.126	   In	   this	   author’s	   opinion,	   Gao	   Quanxi’s	   studies	   of	   political	  constitutionalism	  provide	  an	  insightful	  and	  penetrating	  analysis	  of	  the	  problems	  and	   challenges	   of	   constitutionalism	   for	   the	   PRC.	   His	   scholarship	   excels	   in	  historical	  breadth	  and	  theoretical	  depth,	  and	  deserves	  to	  be	  seriously	  studied	  by	  students	  of	  Chinese	  constitutionalism.	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  1	   The	  following	  articles	  have	  attracted	  particular	  attention	  as	  they	  appeared	  in	  publications	  that	  usually	  represent	  the	  official	  views	  of	  the	  Chinese	  Government	  and	  the	  Chinese	  Communist	  Party:	  Yang	  Xiaoqing（杨晓青）,	  “宪政与人民民主制度之比较研究”	  (Xianzheng	  yu	  renmin	  minzhu	  zhidu	  zhi	  bijiao	  yanjiu)	  [A	  comparative	  study	  of	  constitutionalism	  and	  People’s	  Democracy],	  Hongqi	  wengao	  (红旗文稿),	  2013,	  no.	  10	  (May	  2013),	  available	  at	  http://www.21ccom.net/articles/zgyj/xzmj/article_2013052183896.html;	  Zheng	  Zhixue
（郑志学），“认清宪政的本质”(Renqing	  xianzheng	  de	  benzhi)	  [Understanding	  the	  true	  nature	  of	  constitutionalism],	  Dangjian（党建）,	  2013,	  no.	  6	  (May	  2013),	  available	  at	  http://theory.people.com.cn/n/2013/0529/c83855-­‐21652535.html;	  a	  series	  of	  3	  articles	  by	  Ma	  Zhongcheng（马钟成）published	  in	  People’s	  Daily	  (Overseas	  Edition)	  (人民日报(海外版))	  on	  5-­‐7	  August	  2013	  with	  the	  following	  titles:	  “‘宪政’本质上是一种舆论战武器”(Xianzheng	  benzhi	  shang	  shi	  yizhong	  yulunzhan	  wuqi)	  [‘Constitutionalism’	  is	  in	  essence	  a	  weapon	  of	  the	  war	  of	  public	  opinion],	  “美国宪政的名不副实”(Meiguo	  xianzheng	  de	  mingbufushi)	  [American	  constitutionalism	  is	  a	  term	  that	  does	  not	  correspond	  with	  reality],	  “在中国搞所谓
宪政只能是缘木求鱼”(Zai	  Zhongguo	  gao	  suowei	  xianzheng	  zhi	  neng	  shi	  yuanmuqiuyu)	  [Doing	  ‘constitutionalism’	  in	  China	  is	  like	  fishing	  in	  the	  trees];	  Yin	  Hanning（尹汉宁）,“深刻
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认识意识形态工作的极端重要性”(Shenke	  renshi	  yishixingtai	  gongzuo	  de	  jiduan	  zhongyaoxing)	  [Understanding	  deeply	  the	  utmost	  importance	  of	  ideological	  work],	  Qiushi	  (求是),	  2013,	  no.	  18	  (Sept	  2013),	  available	  at	  http://www.qstheory.cn/zxdk/2013/201318/201309/t20130912_270588.htm;	  Qiu	  Shi（秋
石）,“巩固党和人民团结奋斗的共同思想基础”(Gonggu	  dang	  he	  renmin	  tuanjie	  fendou	  de	  gongtong	  sixiang	  jichu)	  [Consolidating	  the	  common	  ideological	  foundation	  of	  the	  united	  struggles	  of	  the	  Party	  and	  the	  people],	  Qiushi	  (求是),	  2013,	  no.	  20	  (Oct	  2013),	  available	  at	  http://www.qstheory.cn/zxdk/2013/201320/201310/t20131012_278250.htm	  (all	  websites	  mentioned	  here	  were	  lasted	  visited	  on	  3	  March	  2014).	  The	  articles	  cited	  here	  were	  referred	  to	  in	  Zhai	  Xiaobo	  (翟小波),	  “To	  integrate	  the	  non-­‐integrable:	  2013	  and	  the	  bleak	  future	  of	  constitutionalism	  in	  Xi’s	  China”,	  seminar	  at	  the	  Faculty	  of	  Law,	  University	  of	  Hong	  Kong,	  22	  Jan	  2014.	   	  2	   See,	  e.g.,	  the	  symposiums	  of	  articles	  on	  “constitutionalism”	  (xianzheng)	  in	  Yueshu	  qianyan	  (学术前沿),	  2013,	  no.	  8,	  issue	  1,	  and	  Caijing	  Magazine	  (财经),	  14	  Oct	  2013.	  3	   See	  generally	  Richard	  Bellamy,	  Political	  Constitutionalism	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2007).	   	  4 	   See	   generally	   Pan	   Wei-­‐tung,	   The	   Chinese	   Constitution:	   A	   Study	   of	   Forty	   Years	   of	  
Constitution-­‐Making	   in	   China	   (Westport,	   Conn.:	  Hyperion	  Press,	   1983);	   Ch’ien	  Tuan-­‐sheng,	  
The	   Government	   and	   Politics	   of	   China	   1912-­‐1949	   (Cambridge,	   Mass.:	   Harvard	   University	  Press,	  1950).	  5	   On	   modern	   Chinese	   history,	   see,	   e.g.,	   John	   K.	   Fairbank,	   The	   Great	   Chinese	   Revolution	  
1800-­‐1985	  (New	  York:	  Harper	  &	  Row,	  1987);	  Immanuel	  C.Y.	  Hsü,	  The	  Rise	  of	  Modern	  China	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2000).	  6	   See,	  e.g.,	  E.C.Y.	  Tseng,	  Democratic	  and	  Authoritarian	  Elements	  in	  Twentieth-­‐Century	  Chinese	  
Political	  Thought	  (unpublished	  Ph.D.	  thesis,	  New	  York	  University,	  1968),	  pp.	  72ff;	  C.	  C.	  Tan,	  
Chinese	  Political	  Thought	  in	  the	  Twentieth	  Century	  (Newton	  Abbot,	  Devon:	  David	  &	  Charles,	  1972).	   	  7	   See	   Pan	   (note	   4	   above).	   For	   the	   original	   Chinese	   text	   of	   this	   constitution	   and	   other	  20th-­‐century	  Chinese	  constitutions	  up	  to	  1978,	  see	  Chen	  Hefu	  (ed),	  Zhongguo	  xianfa	  leibian	  (Collection	   of	   Chinese	   Constitutions)	   (Beijing:	   Chinese	   Academy	   of	   Social	   Sciences	   Press,	  1980).	   	  8	   See	  generally	  Jing	  Jiren,	  Zhongguo	  lixian	  shi	  (History	  of	  Chinese	  Constitutionalism)	  (Taipei:	  Lianjing,	   1984),	   chap.	   16;	   Chen	   Xinmin,	   Xianfaxue	   shilun	   (Constitutional	   Law)	   (Taipei:	  Sanmin,	  5th	  ed.	  2005),	  chap.	  1.	   	  9	   See	  the	  works	  cited	  in	  note	  6	  above,	  and	  Hsü	  (note	  5	  above),	  p.	  459.	  10	   See	   generally	   Hungdah	   Chiu,	   ‘Constitutional	   Development	   in	   the	   Republic	   of	   China	   in	  Taiwan’,	  in	  Steve	  Tsang	  (ed),	  In	  the	  Shadow	  of	  China:	  Political	  Developments	  in	  Taiwan	  Since	  
1949	  (Hong	  Kong:	  Hong	  Kong	  University	  Press,	  1993),	  chap.	  1;	  Chi-­‐tung	  Lin	  and	  Herbert	  H.P.	  Ma,	   ‘The	  Republic	   of	   China	   (Taiwan)’,	   in	   Lawrence	  W.	   Beer	   (ed),	  Constitutional	   Systems	   in	  
Late	  Twentieth	  Century	  Asia	  (Seattle:	  University	  of	  Washington	  Press,	  1992),	  pp.	  88ff;	  Chen	  (note	  8	  above),	  chap.	  14.	   	  11	   On	  the	  history	  of	  Taiwan,	  see	  generally	  Murray	  A.	  Rubinstein	  (ed),	  Taiwan:	  A	  New	  History	  (Armonk,	  New	  York:	  M.E.	  Sharpe,	  1999);	   John	  F.	  Copper,	  Taiwan:	  Nation-­‐State	  or	  Province?	  (Boulder:	   Westview	   Press,	   3rd	   ed.	   1999);	   Denny	   Roy,	   Taiwan:	   A	   Political	   History	   (Ithaca:	  Cornell	  University	  Press,	  2003).	   	  12	   See	   the	  works	   cited	   in	   note	   11	   above,	   and	   Linda	   Chao	   and	   Ramon	   H.	  Myers,	  The	   First	  
Chinese	   Democracy:	   Political	   Life	   in	   the	   Republic	   of	   China	   on	   Taiwan	   (Baltimore:	   Johns	  Hopkins	  University	  Press,	  1998).	   	  13	   See	  generally	  Chen	  (note	  8	  above),	  chap.	  14;	  Xie	  Zhengdao,	  Zhonghua	  minguo	  xiuxian	  shi	  (The	  History	  of	  Constitutional	  Revisions	  in	  the	  Republic	  of	  China)	  (Taipei:	  Yangzhi	  wenhua,	  2nd	  ed.	  2007).	  14	   On	   the	  history	  of	   the	  PRC,	   see	   generally	   the	  works	   cited	   in	  note	  5	   above,	   and	   Jonathan	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  Fall	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  Rise	  of	  a	  Great	  Power,	  1850-­‐2008	  (London:	  Allen	  Lane,	  2008).	  15	   On	   the	   constitutional	   history	   of	   the	   PRC,	   see	   Xu	   Chongde,	  Zhonghua	   renmin	   gongheguo	  
xianfa	  shi	  (Constitutional	  History	  of	  the	  People’s	  Republic	  of	  China)	  (Fuzhou:	  Fujian	  People’s	  Press,	  2003).	   	  16	   Albert	   H.Y.	   Chen,	   ‘Socialist	   Law,	   Civil	   Law,	   Common	   Law,	   and	   the	   Classification	   of	  Contemporary	  Chinese	  Law’,	   in	  J.M.	  Otto	  et	  al.	  (eds),	  Law-­‐Making	  in	  the	  People’s	  Republic	  of	  
China	  (The	  Hague:	  Kluwer	  Law	  International,	  2000),	  p.	  55,	  at	  p.	  57.	   	  17	   Cai	  Dingjian,	  Xianfa	  jingjie	  (Commentary	  on	  the	  Constitution)	  (Beijing:	  Law	  Press,	  2nd	  ed.	  2006),	  p.	  33.	  18	   Cai	   (note	   17	   above),	   pp.	   73,	   81,	   84,	   99;	   Xu	   (note	   15	   above),	   p.	   878	   (citing	   Peng	   Zhen’s	  speech	  to	  the	  National	  People’s	  Congress	  when	  the	  draft	  constitution	  was	  presented	  to	  it).	   	  19	   Cai	  (note	  17	  above),	  p.	  73.	   	  20	   Albert	   H.Y.	   Chen,	   An	   Introduction	   to	   the	   Legal	   System	   of	   the	   People’s	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